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I. INTRODUCTION
Judge and Mrs. Coffin, Dean Zillman, members of the faculty,
staff and student body of the School of Law, other distinguished
members of the Maine bench and bar, ladies and gentlemen: It is
truly an honor to have been invited to give this year's Coffin Lecture
on Law and Public Service. I know that my former colleague at the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Professor Melvyn Zarr, and my law
school classmate, Professor Martin Rogoff, played a significant role
in making this visit possible and, for that, I am profoundly grateful.
As most of you are aware, Judge Coffin enjoys a distinction
shared by very few other Americans, that of having served in all
three branches of the federal government during his outstanding ca-
reer. I cannot think of anyone who embodies more than he does the
ideal of the dedicated, effective, and compassionate public servant.
I want to express a more particularized thanks to Judge Coffin, how-
ever. As one who has spent many years as an appellate advocate
and who now devotes substantial time as Solicitor General to argu-
ing cases before the Supreme Court or supervising a staff of talented
lawyers who also appear before the Court on a regular basis, I think
that I am in a good position to note Judge Coffin's active interest in
the character and quality of oral argument and his thoughtful writ-
ings and lectures on appellate advocacy.' His efforts in this regard. I
can assure you, have had an important and lasting impact on the
professional development of thousands of lawyers.
II. SELECTIVE FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTION BASED
ON RACE
I have selected as the topic for my lecture "Race and the Federal
Criminal Justice System: A Look at the Issue of Selective Prosecu-
tion" because I want to explore with you one of the most difficult
and troubling questions that an important group of public servants,
federal prosecutors, face today in carrying out their responsibilities.
My credentials are not those of a front-line courtroom prosecutor.
Indeed, those familiar with my background as a civil rights lawyer at
the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and as Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral for Civil Rights in the Carter Administration may find it diffi-
* Solicitor General of the United States.
1. See, eg., FRANK M. COFFIN, A LEXICON OF ORAL ADVOCACY (1984).
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cult to view me as a prosecutor at all. But, as head of the Civil
Rights Division, I authorized and supervised hundreds of prosecu-
tions of law enforcement personnel for constitutional violations, and
of private persons for violating the civil rights of others by subject-
ing them to conditions of peonage or involuntary servitude. With a
few exceptions, the Division's prosecutorial authority comes from
statutes passed just after the Civil War, with the protection of newly
freed slaves in mind.z
In my new capacity as Solicitor General, I am much more re-
moved from the prosecutorial process at the trial level but bear ulti-
mate responsibility in the appellate courts for many prosecutorial
decisions made at lower levels in the federal criminal enforcement
process. I become involved at the Supreme Court stage in deter-
mining whether the United States will seek review of adverse lower
court rulings, both criminal and civil, and what arguments the gov-
ernment will make in such cases, as well as in response to the nu-
merous filings in the Supreme Court made by those who have lost to
the government below. The vast majority of such petitions are from
convicted federal defendants. Members of my staff and I argue the
government's cases in the Court, as well as participate often in oral
argument in non-government cases where we have filed an amicus
brief. Each Term, the Solicitor General and his staff argue in about
two-thirds of the cases heard by the Court. The Solicitor General
also must approve all government appeals (with a few minor excep-
tions) from the district courts.
In the Supreme Court's recently ended Term, my office was in-
volved in federal criminal cases presenting a range of issues from
conspiracy, false statements, sentencing, and obstruction of justice,
to Congress's power under the Commerce Clause to criminalize gun
possession on school grounds. And we participated in several non-
government criminal cases raising questions about the constitutional
status of "knock and announce" requirements and the applicability
of the exclusionary rule to circumstances where court, rather than
police, errors resulted in arguably illegal arrests.
During these years of service in the Justice Department, I have
had an opportunity to work with hundreds of dedicated prosecu-
tors-women and men, of all races and creeds, in Main Justice and
in the United States Attorneys' offices around the country-who
are committed to ensuring that all Americans are afforded the pro-
tection of the federal laws and Constitution, and that violators of
those laws are subjected to even-handed justice in our courts. As a
group, they have shown special concern for the degree to which
drug trafficking and attendant violence in recent years have taken a
2. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866); Civil Rights Act of
1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871); Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat, 336 (1875).
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disproportionate toll in African-American and other minority com-
munities across the country.
Unless there is vigorous enforcement of the law, swift punishment
for predatory criminals irrespective of race, and procedures for
making restitution to the victims of crime, it is difficult to imagine
how African-American communities, especially in our major urban
centers, can serve as viable environments for the normal activities of
life, such as education, employment, economic development, and
entertainment. Consequently, any suggestion that the enormous
power of the government is being used in a selective and discrimina-
tory fashion to prosecute and punish blacks more often or more se-
verely than whites places in doubt the validity of the entire
enterprise. It is a charge that we are, in effect, part of the problem
rather than part of the solution; that we are contributing not to the
improvement of the quality of life in black communities but rather
to the destruction of those communities.
Certainly, selective prosecutions on the basis of race, color, or na-
tional origin have occurred in our history as a nation. One has only
to recall the famous case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins3 in the 1880s, where
the Supreme Court found that San Francisco authorities were selec-
tively enforcing against resident Chinese, but almost never against
whites, laws prohibiting the location of hand laundries in wooden
structures. There, the Court found that the law was being adminis-
tered "with an evil eye and an unequal hand."4  Yick Wo and other
similar cases in the past have taught that to the extent such viola-
tions of constitutional rights are not dealt with promptly and firmly,
all law enforcement efforts undoubtedly suffer thereafter. Failure to
take corrective action will likely result in similar charges being lev-
eled at perfectly sound and legitimate prosecutions, and in the ques-
tioning of the overall credibility of the criminal justice system. As
has often been noted, the support of the citizens for our judicial sys-
tem depends not only upon its being fair in fact, but on its appearing
to be fair as well. The Department's publicly-available Principles of
Federal Prosecution, promulgated originally in 1980 by the Carter
Administration, captures this point well in the following words:
The availability of this statement of Principles to federal law
enforcement officials and to the public serves two important
purposes: ensuring the fair and effective exercise of
prosecutorial responsibility by attorneys for the government,
and promoting confidence on the part of the public and indi-
vidual defendants that important prosecutorial decisions will
be made rationally and objectively on the merits of each case.5
3. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
4. At at 373-74.
5. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REVISED PRINCIPLES OF FE-DERAL PROSE-
CUTION 1-2 (1993).
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That is why we in the Department of Justice are extremely con-
cerned about charges of selective prosecution on the basis of race in
the federal criminal justice system in three specific areas: (1) the
prosecution of crack offenders; (2) the imposition of significantly
harsher penalties for crack, as opposed to cocaine powder, offenses;
and (3) decisions with respect to seeking the death penalty. In each
of these areas, the Attorney General and other top Justice Depart-
ment officials have gone to great lengths to evaluate these claims
and have found no basis for believing that they accurately describe
the way in which federal prosecutorial decisions are made. Never-
theless, we also believe that federal prosecution practices should be
the subject of ongoing research and review to ensure that they are
consistent with constitutional norms and the policies of the Clinton
Administration.
A. Prosecution of Crack Offenders
A recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in a case called United States v. Armstrong6 has
spawned a number of selective prosecution claims by African-
American defendants charged with crack cocaine offenses. Arm-
strong presents the question of what degree of evidence a defendant
must adduce to justify an order requiring discovery from the govern-
ment on a claim of selective prosecution. In Armstrong, five black
defendants indicted in the Central District of California (which in-
cludes Los Angeles County) on various crack charges alleged that
the U.S. Attorney's Office had determined to prosecute them be-
cause of their race.7 These prosecutions involved more than twice
the quantity necessary to trigger ten-year mandatory sentences;
there were multiple sales involving multiple defendants, thereby in-
dicating a substantial crack cocaine ring; there were multiple federal
firearms violations intertwined with the narcotics trafficking; the
overall evidence was extremely strong, including audio and video-
tapes of the defendants; threats had been made to the arresting of-
ficers by one of the defendants; and several of the defendants had
criminal histories including narcotics and firearm violations. In sup-
port of their motion for discovery, the defendants offered only one
item of evidentiary support-an affidavit from a paralegal employed
by the Federal Public Defender (FPD) stating that, in 1991, all of
the 24 defendants in crack cases closed by the FPD were black.8
The defendants asserted that this statistic alone lent support to their
claim that blacks, but not whites, were being prosecuted federally
rather than by the state to ensure that they would be subject to the
6. 48 F.3d 1508 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 2581
(U.S. July 27, 1995) (No. 95-157).
7. Id at 1511.
8. Id
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stiffer federal sentences if convicted. The district court found this
showing sufficient to justify discovery, a ruling that was upheld by
the Ninth Circuit.9
In the view of the Justice Department, the Ninth Circuit's ruling
in Armstrong significantly relaxed the previously-accepted standard
that defendants had to meet before they would be entitled to discov-
ery on a selective prosecution claim. In the past, defendants were
required to show the existence of similarly situated non-minority de-
fendants who were not prosecuted. 10 Because discovery on these
issues is extremely burdensome and time-consuming, and may re-
quire the government to disclose internal information typically
thought to fall within the wide discretionary berth afforded to prose-
cutors, Armstrong raised an issue of substantial importance to fed-
eral law enforcement. As a consequence, I recently authorized a
government petition to the Supreme Court to accept the Armstrong
case for review in hopes of obtaining a reversal of the Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision.
In United States v. Henry," another recent case from the Central
District of California, two defendants charged with crack cocaine
trafficking offenses sought an order compelling discovery in connec-
tion with their claim that the government had chosen to prosecute
them because they were black and Hispanic. The defendants relied
primarily on a study purporting to show a statistically significant dis-
parity between the numbers of whites prosecuted for cocaine-based
offenses in state court, as opposed to federal court, for the years
1989 through 1991. They also relied on the Federal Public Defender
affidavit that had been offered in Armstrong. The government filed
an extensive response to the motion including numerous affidavits
and supporting documentation explaining specifically the basis on
which these particular defendants were targeted for prosecution
9. Id. at 1520.
10. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608-10 (1985). For general discussions
of the selective prosecution doctrine, see P.S. Kane, Why Have You Singled Me Out?
The Use of Prosecutorial Discretion for Selective Prosecution. 67 TuLt L. REv. 2293
(1993); Ellen S. Podgor & Jeffrey S. Weiner, Prosecutorial Misconduct: Alive and
Well, and Living in Indiana?. 3 GEo. J. LEGAL ETmics 657 (1990); Steven Alan
Reiss, Prosecutorial intent in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 135 U. PA. L. Rv.
1365 (1987); Tobin J. Romero, Project: Twenty-Fourth Annual Review of Criminal
Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1993-1994, 83 GEO.
L.J. 665, 839 (1995); Gary D. Sarles, First Amendment and Equal Protection-Selec-
tive Service or Prosecution for the "Vocal" Nonregistrants?, 76 J. Cmbt. L & CRIMt.
NOLOGY 856 (1985); Peter M. Shane, Equal Protection, Free Speech, and the Selective
Prosecution of Draft Nonregistrants, 72 IowA L REv. 359 (1987); William G. Bern-
hardt, Note, Constitutional Law: The Conflict of First Amendment Rights and the
Motive Requirement in Selective Enforcement Cases, 39 OKa. L REv. 498 (1986);
Barry Lynn Creech, Note, And Justice For AlL- Wayte v. United States and the De-
fense of Selective Prosecution, 64 N.C. L. Rv. 385 (1986).
11. No. CR 94-628-CBM (C.D. Cal. 1995).
19961
MAINE LAW REVIEW
and, more generally, the race-neutral criteria used to determine
which offenders will be federally prosecuted. In this case, unlike in
Armstrong, the district court denied the defendants' motion. Henry,
however, is an example of the enormous investment of resources
required by motions of this nature-roughly 1000 attorney-hours
were required to produce the government's response. 12
The selective prosecution issue raised in Armstrong and Henry is
an important and recurring one. As of July 1995, there were dozens
of selective prosecution motions at various stages of litigation in the
Ninth Circuit alone.' 3 The overwhelming majority of these are
either crack cases of the Armstrong type or imrmgration cases in-
volving alien Latino defendants charged with reentering the United
States after having been deported in connection with felony convic-
tions.' 4 The government's opposing submissions in these cases gen-
erally have become significantly more lengthy, and typically include
statistical data, information concerning the charging practices of the
U.S. Attorney's Office, and affidavits from law enforcement officers
involved in the particular prosecution. These developments cer-
tainly lend credence to the Supreme Court's observation that crimi-
nal defendants "often will transform [their] resentment at being
prosecuted into the ascription of improper and malicious actions to
the [government's] advocate."'" We feel confident that the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Armstrong was wrong and that the trial court's
rejection of the selective prosecution claim in Henry reinforces that
conclusion.
There is no denying, however, that nationwide statistics on federal
crack cocaine prosecutions by race are rather stark: Blacks com-
prise 90% and whites just under 4% of crack defendants.' 6 More-
over, there appears to be a significant disparity between the
percentage of African-Americans who use illicit drugs in a given
year and those arrested for drug crimes who are African-Ameri-
can.' 7 And, finally, some have claimed, as did the defendants in
Armstrong and Henry, that crack defendants who are black are
more likely to be prosecuted federally (and therefore are subject to
12. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, United States v. Armstrong, 48 F.3d
1508 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-157) (July 1995), at 23 n.3.
13. 1I at 22 n.2. 24 n.4 (citing 34 cases in the Ninth Circuit).
14. Id. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1988).
15. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 425 (1976).
16. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT 107 (1994) [hereinafter
ANNUAL REPORT].
17. Compare SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN., U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON
DRUG ABUSE: POPULATION ESTIMATES 1993 17, 19 (1994) [hereinafter HOUSEHOLD
SURVEY] (reporting that approximately 12% of Americans who used illicit drugs in
1993 were African-American) with Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime
Reports (1994) (reporting that approximately 39% of those arrested in a year for
drug crimes are African-American).
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harsher penalties under the Sentencing Guidelines and mandatory
minimums), while whites are more likely to be prosecuted by state
law enforcement. Our response to these data and allegations has
not been to brush them aside but rather to explore their implications
and to develop the most reliable empirical information possible to
ensure that the federal government is acting fairly in this regard on a
national basis.
On the issue of the disparity between African-American drug use
and drug arrest statistics, we think that there may be several reasons
to question its significance. To date, there has been no single na-
tional study conducted which compares the race of drug users and
drug sellers, and it is problematic to compare the results of studies
that sample different populations, use different methodologies, and
do not control for the same variables. Moreover, race need not be
the only explanation for any disparity, because there is empirical
data to support the belief that the populations of drug users and
sellers are not coextensive, and that the percentages of persons of a
particular race who use a drug and who sell the drug may be very
different.' 8 There is also evidence that, for historical and socioeco-
nomic reasons, members of a particular race may dominate traffick-
ing in particular drugs. For example, of those defendants sentenced
federally in 1994, approximately 73% of methamphetamine defend-
ants were white; 93% of LSD defendants were white; and 44% of
marijuana defendants were white. 51% Hispanic. and 4% black.' 9
In order to determine whether race plays a part in arrest deci-
sions, it is important to control for variables other than race that
may affect a person's risk of arrest. One such factor is the type of
drug used. Data provided by the Office of Policy Development
(OPD) at the Department of Justice show that cocaine and heroin
users are anywhere between four times (at the most conservative
estimate) and nine times more likely to be arrested in a given year
than are marijuana users. The OPD has found that this differential
holds across racial groups; that is, members of all races are more
likely to be arrested for cocaine or heroin use. African-Americans
account for a disproportionate percentage of users of those drugs
that carry the highest risks of arrest.
A second non-race variable that may affect the risk of arrest is the
frequency of drug use. Criminologists agree that the more a person
uses drugs, the greater the risk of arrest. This is not just a simple
arithmetic equivalency either, because frequent drug use correlates
with practices that themselves increase the risk of arrest, such as
possessing larger amounts of the drug, associating with other users,
18. Compare U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, SPECIAL REPORT TO "rE CoN.
GRESS: CocAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING Potucy 79-83 (1995) [hereinafter SPE.
ctAL REPORT] with HOUSEHOLD SURVEY, supra note 17. at 114-15.
19. ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 107.
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and committing other crimes to support drug habits. Survey data
suggest that African-American drug users are likely to use drugs
more frequently than whites.20 Consequently, the percentage of Af-
rican-American users probably significantly undercounts the total
drug use of that population.
A third variable that may affect arrest rates is the geographic lo-
cation of drug use. Data provided by the OPD show that the risk of
arrest for a drug user living in a Metropolitan Statistical Area
(MSA) of over one million is more than twice as high as the risk for
a user living in a non-MSA (rural county). Again, this difference
holds true across racial groups. The data also show that the African-
American population is disproportionately concentrated in large
metropolitan areas. More to the point, the African-American drug
user population is disproportionately concentrated in the large met-
ropolitan areas that carry the highest risks of arrest.
I realize that these realities with respect to the impact of drugs on
African-Americans are unpleasant to confront. But ignoring them
will not make them go away. The fact is that the African-American
community is being ravaged by trafficking in crack cocaine. A 1994
report found, for example, that 71.5% of emergency room admis-
sions for crack-related problems involved blacks.2' Moreover,
blacks comprise over 69% of the admissions for treatment for crack
abuse, whereas whites comprise only 24%.
With respect to the federal/state prosecution issue, the data are
very incomplete. Although the U.S. Sentencing Commission pub-
lishes detailed information about federal defendants sentenced for
crack, there is no comparable information available for defendants
prosecuted or sentenced for crack at the state level. Relevant state
statistics are particularly hard to come by because the majority of
states do not distinguish between crack and powder cocaine for pen-
alty or record-keeping purposes. In response to a request by the
Sentencing Commission for crack data, only three states were able
to provide even a statistic on the total number of crack cases han-
dled in a year.2 3
In view of this dearth of pertinent information, there is a clear
need to explore the availability of state data and to assess what
would be required to undertake a 50-state study of crack offenders.
It will not be adequate, however, simply to compare the number and
20. See, e.g., HOUSEHOLD SURVEY, supra note 17, at 108-09, 114-15.
21. DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, CRACK COCAINE
INTELLIGENCE REPORT 22 (1994).
22. SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND HUM. SERVICES, PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF ADMISSIONS TO TREAT-
MENT BY SEX, AGE, AND RACE/ETHNICrrY (October 1992-September 1993) (unpub-
lished chart, on file with Maine Law Review).
23. SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 138 (only South Carolina, Minnesota, and
Virginia could provide statistics on the number of crack cocaine cases).
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race of crack defendants at the federal and state levels. In order to
permit fair comparisons, any study must control for key variables
such as criminal history, possession versus distribution, whether a
gun was used, and the amount of the drug involved. Those variables
may be relevant to any apparent disparities between state and fed-
eral prosecutions.
The bottom line of all I have said thus far is that we are making
serious and concerted efforts to locate explanations for nation-wide
federal prosecution figures that appear, at a superficial level, to be
out of line from a racial perspective.
B. Federal Sentencing Disparities Between Crack and Powder
Cocaine Offenses
The second area of concern arises with respect to the disparity
between penalties under federal law for crack and powder cocaine
offenses. The Sentencing Reform Act of 198424 was enacted by
Congress to promote "the rationalization and lessening of disparity
among criminal sentences."'  Under the prior system of indetermi-
nate sentencing of federal defendants, the only restriction on judges
was that they not impose sentences which exceeded the statutory
maximum terms of imprisonment. The United States Sentencing
Commission was created, as part of that legislation, to promulgate,
and periodically to review and revise, determinative sentence guide-
lines. 6 Under the current federal Sentencing Guidelines, narcotics
offenses involving one gram of crack cocaine are punished as se-
verely as equivalent offenses involving 100 grams of powder co-
caine.27 That disparity has been the subject of frequent criticism
from various quarters on the ground that the 100-to-1 powder/crack
sentencing ratio has an unfair impact on racial minorities.' The ar-
gument is that because, as a statistical matter, minorities are more
24. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-
3625 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998).
25. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises
Upon Which They Rest, 17 Hors-RA L. REv. 1, 32 (1988).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1988). See also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 369
(1989); G. KAT'AN, INSIDE THE CRIMINAL PROcEss 358-85 (1991).
27. 18 U.S.S.G. § 2DI.1(c) (Drug Quantity Table).
28. See, eg., Kimberly Mache Maxwell, A Disparity That is Worlds Apart: The
Federal Sentencing Guidelines Treatment of Crack Cocaine and Powder Cocaine,
RACE & ETmHic ANC S'RY L. DIG. 21 (Apr. 1995); Henry J. Reske, Congress
Asked to Lower Crack Penalties, A.B.A. J., July 1995, at 30; Jerome H. Skolnick,
Racial Bias is Built Into the Law, BALTIMORE SUN, June 21, 1995, at 15A; Ari Arm-
strong, Crack Cocaine: Make the Sentencing Fair, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 1995, at
A17; Cocaine" Crack and Powder, WAsH. POST, Mar. 10, 1995, at A20; Facing Up to
Crack Injustice, N.Y. TiMEs, Apr. 19, 1995, at A22; Toni Locy, Panel Plans to Amend
Sentencing Disparity for Crack Dealers, WAsH. POST, Mar. 1, 1995, at D3; Bill
Rankin, Crack Cocaine Law Declared Racist, Illegal Harsh Penalties Imposed on
Blacks, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 19, 1994, at Al.
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likely to use and sell crack cocaine, while non-minorities are more
likely to use and sell powder cocaine, minorities are punished far
more severely for equivalent offenses.
Each of the twelve federal circuit courts that has considered a
constitutional challenge to the crack/powder sentencing disparity
has held that the disparity does not violate the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment.29 Those courts generally have
agreed that there is no evidence that Congress acted with discrimi-
natory intent when it enacted the sentencing ratio, and that the dis-
tinction has a rational basis grounded, among other reasons, in the
differing addictiveness of the two forms of the drug, and the differ-
ent levels of violence associated with their use.
This is not to suggest that these courts, in finding current federal
penalties for crack cocaine constitutional, have wholeheartedly en-
dorsed them as a matter of policy. Indeed, in a recent First Circuit
decision, in which Judge Coffin joined, the court observed:
Finally, we note that while "[t]he equal protection obliga-
tion imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment is not an obligation to provide the best governance
possible," the absence of a constitutional command is not an
invitation to government complacency. Although [the defend-
ant] has not established a constitutional violation, he has
raised important questions about the efficacy and fairness of
our current sentencing policies for offenses involving cocaine
substances. We leave the resolution of these matters to the
considered judgment of those with the proper authority and
institutional capacity.30
Responding at least in part to claims of racial bias in sentencing,
the United States Sentencing Commission adopted in April 1995, by
a 4-3 vote, amendments to the Guidelines that would treat crack
and powder cocaine alike, both for trafficking and for simple posses-
29. See United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Wil-
liamson, 53 F.3d 1500 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 218 (1995); United
States v. Cherry, 50 F.3d 338 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Johnson, 40 F.3d 436
(D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1412 (1995); United States v. Lewis, 40 F.3d
1325 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Harden, 37 F.3d 595 (11th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Clary, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1172 (1995);
United States v. Coleman, 24 F.3d 37 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 261
(1994); United States v. D'Anjou, 16 F.3d 604 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
2754 (1994); United States v. Lloyd, 10 F.3d 1197 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 1569 (1994); United States v. Frazier, 981 F.2d 92 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 1661 (1993); United States v. Lawrence, 951 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1991).
30. United States v. Singleterry, 29 F.3d 733, 741 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 647 (1994) (footnote omitted) (quoting Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221,230
(1981)). See also, United States v. Then, 56 F.3d at 466 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
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sion offenses. 3 Specifically, the penalties for crack offenses would
be lowered to match the current levels for cocaine powder. Those
amendments were submitted to Congress on May 1 and will auto-
matically become effective on November 1, 1995, unless Congress
specifically disapproves them.32 The Commission also submitted a
legislative proposal to Congress to eliminate the differential treat-
ment of crack and powder in the mandatory minimum sentences
currently provided by statute.33 The Guidelines' amendments are
not contingent on amendment of the minimums, however.
The Department of Justice officially opposes equalization of the
penalties for crack and powder offenses for trafficking offenses.'
For example, under the proposed amendments, an individual con-
victed of distributing fifty grams of crack (about 500 doses)-who
currently would receive a mandatory minimum sentence of ten
years' imprisonment-would face a Guidelines sentence of just
twenty-one to twenty-seven months' imprisonment, and could re-
ceive as little as four to ten months' imprisonment, if found to have
accepted responsibility for the offense and played a minor role in its
commission.35 The Department's position is that crack is a more
dangerous substance than powder and that, assuming that quantity
and other factors are identical, crack trafficking therefore is the
more serious offense.
The following facts support this conclusion: Crack is more psy-
chologically addictive than powder because it can be readily
smoked, and results in quicker and more intense effects for the
user.
36
Those who smoke crack reach maximum physiological effects
in approximately two minutes and maximum psychotropic ef-
fects in just one minute. In contrast, those who snort cocaine
powder reach these effects in 40 and 20 minutes, respectively.
Crack that is smoked enters the brain in just 19 seconds, com-
pared to five minutes for cocaine powder that is snorted.
31. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING
GuiDEuNES (May 1, 1995); Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United
States Courts, 60 Fed. Reg. 25074 (May 10. 1995) (Amendment 5).
32. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (1988).
33. See The Crack/Cocaine Penalty Ratio: Recommendations to Congress, 7 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 312, 314 (1995) [hereinafter Crack/Cocaine Recommendationsl.
34. See generally Crack Cocaine Sentencing: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (forthcoming
1996) [hereinafter House Hearings] (statement of Jo Ann Harris, Assistant Attorney
General, Criminal Division, U.S. Dept. of Justice); Examining U.S. Sentencing Com-
mission Recommendations for Cocaine Sentencing: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) [hereinafter Senate Hearings]
(statement of Jo Ann Harris, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S.
Dept. of Justice).
35. Senate Hearings, supra note 34, at 11.
36. Id at 10.
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Smoking crack is also a more efficient absorption route than
snorting powder. However, the duration of effect for crack is
shorter than for cocaine powder when snorted: 30 minutes,
compared to 60 minutes. Duration of effect is significant be-
cause it is related to dependency; because of the short but in-
tense nature of the euphoria induced by crack, the user is
more likely to administer the drug frequently and in binges.
In summary, crack is more psychologically addictive than co-
caine powder.37
Crack can also easily be broken down and packaged into small,
inexpensive quantities for distribution; crack's low cost and high risk
of addiction make it especially appealing to the poor and the young,
and street-based marketing patterns for crack generate high rates of
violence and contribute heavily to the deterioration of
communities.38
Accordingly, the Department has submitted a legislative proposal
to Congress to disapprove the Guidelines' amendments that would
equalize the penalties for crack and powder trafficking.39 That legis-
lation was introduced in the House of Representatives on July 24,
1995. The Department's proposal does not disapprove equalization
of the penalties for simple possession of crack and powder.40
The Department agrees, however, that the current 100-to-1 pen-
alty ratio for trafficking offenses merits reconsideration and possible
change.41 Indeed, as one of the dissenting members of the Commis-
sion, on which the Attorney General sits as a non-voting ex officio
member, aptly remarked:
Despite the Commission's divided vote on Amendment Five,
which proposes to reduce the quantity ratio between powder
and crack cocaine to one-to-one, our recent report to Con-
gress unanimously rejected the pre-existing 100-to-1 quantity
ratio between powder and crack cocaine.
Narrowing the differential would, for example, reflect the fact that
cocaine powder can easily be transformed into crack. The Depart-
ment has not, however, endorsed a specific ratio-it only contends
that any ratio must continue to account for the systemic harms asso-
ciated with crack; that individuals who deal in significant quantities
of crack must receive certain incarceration regardless of downward
37. Id. (citations omitted).
38. Id
39. Id. at 12. See also House Hearings, supra note 34, at 8 (Justice Department
Proposed Bill); Crack/Cocaine Recommendations, supra note 33, at 325-27.
40. House Hearings, supra note 34, at 8 (Justice Department Proposed Bill);
Crack/Cocaine Recommendations, supra note 33, at 325-27.
41. See Senate Hearings, supra note 34, at 12.
42. Crack/Cocaine Recommendations, supra note 33, at 322 (View of Commis-
sioner Goldsmith Dissenting, in Part, from Amendment Five and Related Legisla-
tive Recommendation).
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adjustments under the Guidelines; and that the ratio must provide
for sufficiently harsh sentences to motivate defendants to accept re-
sponsibility for their actions and cooperate with law enforcement in
the prosecution of others. The Department believes that Congress
is in the best position to weigh the policy considerations relating to a
particular quantity ratio for the sentencing of crack and powder traf-
ficking offenses.
C. Capital Punishment
The last area I want to address is that of capital punishment.
Congress reinstituted a federal death penalty in the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 198813 for a limited number of crimes. In the Omni-
bus Crime Bill of 1994,44 however, Congress expanded the number
of federal capital crimes to more than fifty. In response, the Depart-
ment of Justice developed this year a detailed protocol setting forth
the policies and procedures to be followed in all federal cases in
which a defendant is charged with an offense subject to the death
penalty.45 Death penalty guidelines never existed previously at the
Justice Department. It should be noted that prior to the promulga-
tion of the new protocol, pursuant to motions to dismiss capital in-
dictments based upon selective prosecutions, three United States
district courts conducted thorough reviews of all Department of Jus-
tice files for all pending or completed prosecutions at the time of
each review. None of these courts found any evidence of racial bias
or the use of impermissible factors in the decision-making process
employed by the Department in capital cases.'
For example, in a 1993 ruling, the district court for the Northern
District of Georgia observed:
It appears to this court that the decision[s] to seek a death
penalty in cases presented to the Attorney General were each
based on objective circumstances of each particular case
[which] were proper and legitimate grounds for the decision.
The records indicate that the decision of the prosecutor and
that of the Attorney General did not in any way involve the
race of the accused. 47
43. Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988).
44. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L No. 103-
322, 108 Stat. 1796, 1968-1982 (1994).
45. U.S. DEP'T OF JusTicE, 3a UNrrnD STATES AT-rORNEYS' MANUAL, § 9-10.000
(1995).
46. United States v. Bradley, No. 1: CR-92-200, Memorandum and Order at 2-8
(M.D. Pa. May 27, 1994); United States v. Brown, No. 92-81127, Order (E.D. Mich.
May 24, 1994); United States v. Williams, No. 1:92-CR-142-01, Order Quashing Sub-
poenas at 2 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 21, 1993) (on file with Maine Law Review).
47. United States v. Williams, No. 1:92-CR-142-01, Order Quashing Subpoenas
at 2.
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And in a 1994 decision from the Western District of Pennsylvania,
the court stated that the Department's criteria, policies and proce-
dures "actually demonstrate a heightened concern with ensuring
that the death penalty is not unfairly imposed because of race or
ethnic origin. 48
But the history of the death penalty raises sufficiently serious con-
cerns about the potential for racially discriminatory imposition that
particularly rigorous safeguards against such practices seem war-
ranted. Indeed, only eight years ago, the Supreme Court, in a five to
four decision, upheld against charges of racial discrimination Geor-
gia's system for imposing the death penalty in the case of McClesky
v. Kemp.49 And the federal district court in Pennsylvania remarked
that:
[t]hough the documents submitted do not suggest any intent
[on the federal government's part] to seek, approve or with-
draw requests for the death penalty on racially impermissible
grounds, it remains troubled by the skewed statistics revealing
that most defendants for whom the death penalty has been
sought and/or approved have been black, with an additional
few being Hispanics and very few being white.5 0
The new policy is an effort to provide even greater assurance that
the decision to seek capital punishment is made fairly and consist-
ently, in a manner free from ethnic, racial, or other invidious
discrimination.
The federal death penalty may not be sought without the prior
written authorization of the Attorney General.5 ' In any case in
which the U.S. Attorney has charged, or intends to charge, a defend-
ant with an offense subject to the death penalty, regardless of
whether the U.S. Attorney actually wishes to seek it, the lead Assis-
tant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) must complete a standard "Death Pen-
alty Evaluation" form. 2 That form requires the AUSA to set out:
(1) the theory of prosecution; (2) all statutory aggravating factors
for the crime(s) charged; (3) all non-statutory aggravating factors;
(4) all statutory mitigating factors; and (5) all non-statutory mitigat-
ing factors.53 The protocol directs the AUSA to enumerate only
those aggravating factors that can be proved at a sentencing pro-
ceeding beyond a reasonable doubt, but to list all mitigating factors
that are "reasonably raised by the evidence," or which the defend-
ant is likely to be able to prove by a preponderance of the evi-
48. United States v. Bradley, No. 1: CR-92-200, Memorandum and Order at 3.
49. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
50. United States v. Bradley, No. 1: CR-92-200, Memorandum and Order at 7.
51. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 3a UNITED STATES ATrORNEYS' MANUAL, § 9-
10.000, 1 (1995).
52. Id. at 2.
53. I& at app. A at 1-15.
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dence. 4 Finally, the AUSA must set out a qualitative analysis that
balances the aggravating and mitigating factors, recommends
whether to seek the death penalty, and explains the reasons for that
recommendation. 55
The Death Penalty Evaluation, along with any written material
from defense counsel, is then forwarded to a review committee ap-
pointed by the Attorney General.16 Counsel for the defendant is
offered the opportunity to present to the Review Committee, orally
or in writing, the reasons why the death penalty should not be
sought. According to the protocol, the Committee must consider all
information presented to it, "including any evidence of racial bias
against the defendant or evidence that the Department has engaged
in a pattern or practice of racial discrimination in the administration
of the federal death penalty."'  The Committee is required to sub-
mit a written recommendation to the Attorney General, who then
conducts a separate review and makes the final decision in all cases
whether the government will seek the death penalty. The death
penalty authorization process is designed to promote consistency
and fairness, a goal which is served by the fact that ultimate deci-
sional authority is vested in a single individual, the Attorney Gen-
eral, in all cases.
III. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I believe that charges of selective prosecution on
the basis of race (or on any other invidious grounds. for that matter)
must be taken seriously. But I also think that reason, not rhetoric,
should guide our consideration of such charges. Where they prove
to be true, the federal government has a constitutional duty to take
corrective action. Where they are unjustified, we should be candid
in saying so, even though it may involve discussing unpleasant reali-
ties about race and crime. Moreover, the efforts of the Sentencing
Commission to achieve a reduction in the current 100-to-i ratio of
crack cocaine to cocaine powder sentences-which the Justice De-
partment has endorsed in principle, despite its disagreement with
the 1-to-1 ratio-reflect that the federal government is not taking
"the absence of a constitutional command [as] an invitation to gov-
ernment complacency.-5 8 Most important, however, is that the fed-
eral government must ensure that adequate procedural mechanisms
are in place-such as the Department's new Death Penalty Proto-
col-to guard against racially discriminatory enforcement of the
54. Id. at app. A at 3, 9, 11, 13, 15.
55. Id. at app. A at 16-17.
56. Id. at 2.
57. Id.
58. United States v. Singleterry, 29 F.3d, 733, 741 (1st Cir. 1994).
1996]
196 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:179
laws. Our oaths of office as prosecutors and the communities we
serve demand no less.
Thank you and good evening.
